The role of expecting feedback during decision-making under risk by Rigoli, F. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Rigoli, F. ORCID: 0000-0003-2233-934X, Martinelli, C. and Shergill, S.S. (2019). 
The role of expecting feedback during decision-making under risk. NeuroImage, 202, 
116079.. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2019.116079 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/22772/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2019.116079
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
 1 
 
The role of expecting feedback during decision-making under risk 
 
Francesco Rigoli1,2, Cristina Martinelli3,4 and Sukhwinder Shergill3 
 
 
1 City, University of London, Northampton Square, London, EC1V 0HB, UK 
2 The Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, UCL, 12 Queen Square, London, WC1N 3BG, UK 
3Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King’s College London, 16 De Crespigny Park Road, London, SE5 8AF, UK 
4Kingston University, Penrhyn Road, Kingston Upon Thames, Surrey, KT1 2EE, UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correspondence: Francesco Rigoli 
Department of Psychology 
City, University of London 
Northampton Square, London, UK EC1V 0HB 
francesco.rigoli@city.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
ABSTRACT 
Sometimes choice is followed by outcome feedback and other times it is not. It remains unknown 
whether humans prefer gambling when they expect feedback to be revealed. Regarding this 
question, decision-making theories make alternative predictions. Some theories have proposed that 
choice is influenced by whether one expects to be disappointed in the future. Given that feedback is 
sometimes disappointing, these theories predict increased aversion towards gambling when 
feedback is expected compared to when feedback is not expected. The opposite effect is predicted 
by theories of curiosity, which postulate reduction of uncertainty as an important behavioural drive. 
Given that feedback reduces uncertainty, these theories predict that gambling will be favoured when 
feedback is expected. To examine whether expecting feedback influences gambling behaviour, we 
recorded functional neuroimaging data while participants performed a novel decision-making task 
requiring to chose between a sure option and a gamble. Crucially, participants expected to receive 
feedback in some trials but not in other trials. Consistent with theories of curiosity, we found that 
expecting feedback increased gambling propensity. At the neural level, at option presentation the 
increased value of gambling during feedback was reflected in activity in the ventral striatum. This 
suggests that, together with its established role in signalling reward, the ventral striatum also 
processes a form of epistemic value. Our study demonstrates that gambling becomes more 
attractive when feedback is expected and suggests that striatal activity could signal the value of 
feedback information.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes choice is followed by outcome feedback and other times it is not. Playing slot machines is 
an example of the former case, because each individual decision is followed immediately by a clear 
outcome feedback. Conversely, consider a company engaged in a door-to-door flyer marketing 
campaign. Although the global effect of the campaign can be estimated, the outcome obtained by 
each single flyer (e.g., whether it has encouraged people to buy the product or not) will remain 
unknown. An open question is whether decision-making changes when humans expect to receive 
feedback after choice compared to when feedback is not expected. Answering this question is 
important because understanding the role of expecting feedback can arbitrate between influential 
decision-making theories. It has been proposed that expecting feedback evokes anticipatory feelings 
of disappointment, and that these influence choice (Bell, 1985; Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 
2005; 2007; Loomes & Sugden, 1986). Given that feedback is sometimes disappointing, this proposal 
implicates an increased avoidance of gambling when feedback is expected. The opposite prediction 
arises from perspectives emphasizing curiosity as an important behavioural drive (Baldassarre & 
Mirolli, 2013; Friston et al., 2015; Gottlieb, 2012; Gottlieb et al., 2014; Kidd & Hayden, 2015). 
According to this view, feedback is associated with epistemic value because it reduces uncertainty, 
and thus expecting feedback should enhance gambling.  
Motivated by this reasoning, our study examined the cognitive and neural processes underlying the 
impact of expecting feedback on decision-making under risk. We recorded functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) data while participants performed a new gambling task (fig. 1A) in which, 
on each trial, they chose between a sure monetary gain or loss and a 50-50 gamble. The two options 
always had equivalent expected value (EV; i.e., the sum of possible outcomes multiplied by their 
probability – here always 0.5 for the gamble). Across trials, we manipulated orthogonally the EV of 
options and the range associated with the possible outcomes of the gamble (gamble range, GR). For 
example, trials characterized by -£8 EV comprise of an option associated with a sure £8 loss and a 
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gamble that may be associated with either -£4 and -£12 (implying a £8 GR) or with -£6 and -£10 
(implying a £4 GR). Crucially, in different blocks, outcome feedback was either provided or not. The 
two conditions were equally consequential, as participants were instructed that an outcome was 
collected immediately after choice independent of whether it was shown to them or not (see 
Methods). Our behavioural analyses were based on comparing choice during feedback versus no-
feedback trials. 
Previous research has focused on how outcome experience drives learning (Barron & Erev, 2003; 
FitzGerald et al., 2010; Glaser et al., 2012; Hertwig et al., 2004; Jessup et al., 2008; Ludvig & Spetch, 
2011; Lejarraga & Gonzalez, 2011; Wu et al., 2011; Wulff et al., 2018). Here we were not interested 
in learning, and we minimized any learning influence by explicitly informing participants about 
option amounts and probabilities. Our focus was on the role of an expectation about whether 
feedback will be provided or not. Hence, before each new block, participants were explicitly 
informed about whether feedback was given. In addition, in the task feedback was totally irrelevant 
for reward maximization, because each trial was independent and because the gamble probability 
was always 50-50 (and participants were explicitly informed about this). This allowed us to probe the 
role of expecting feedback per se, independent of whether feedback is also helpful for reward 
maximization in the future.  
A critical aim of our study was to elucidate the neural processes underlying the influence of 
expecting feedback on choice. In the context of our task, theories of curiosity suggest that feedback 
reduces uncertainty and hence it is associated with epistemic value (Baldassarre & Mirolli, 2013; 
Friston et al., 2015; Gottlieb, 2012; Gottlieb et al., 2014; Kidd & Hayden, 2015). A possibility is that 
such epistemic value is reflected in activity within regions known to reflect the value of options. One 
of the key regions for evaluation and choice processes is the ventral striatum of the basal ganglia (for 
a review, see Bartra et al., 2013). An important observation is that, when a set of options is 
presented, activity in ventral striatum correlates with the EV of the chosen option (Bartra et al., 
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2013). This evidence can be integrated with theories of curiosity, inspiring the prediction that,  in our 
task, at option presentation when a gamble is chosen the ventral striatum would respond more 
during feedback compared to no-feedback trials, reflecting an increased attraction for gambling 
during feedback trials.  
Contrary to many previous studies, our design independently manipulates EV and GR. Standard 
models of choice would predict that the influence of EV and GR can be explained by a unique 
underlying factor, such as a non-linear value function as in expected utility theory (Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1945) and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), or a risk sensitivity as in risk-
return accounts (Markowitz, 1952; Sarin & Weber, 1993; Weber et al., 2004). For example, expected 
utility theory proposes that the mapping from reward amount to subjective value follows a concave 
function, an aspect proposed to be sufficient for explaining the combined influence of EV and GR on 
choice (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1945).  By independently manipulating EV and GR, we tested 
whether, in line with these models, a single factor was sufficient to characterize the combined 
influence of EV and GR, or whether an explanation based on multiple factors was necessary. This 
allowed us to probe the specific neural substrates associated with the influence of EV and GR on 
choice. We examined whether the EV component was processed in the ventral striatum and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), two main regions implicated in processing the value of 
options (Bartra et al., 2013; Boorman et al., 2009; 2013; Fitzgerald et al., 2009; Hunt et al., 2012; 
Rigoli et al., 2016a; Strait el al., 2014). The GR component was predicted to be associated with 
activity in anterior insula. According to prior research, anterior insula is a key region for processing 
aspects of risk (Mohr et al., 2010; Payzan-LeNestour et al., 2013; Paulus et al., 2003; Preuschoff et 
al., 2008; Rigoli et al., 2016a; Rudorf et al., 2012). Given that, according to influential economic 
models (Markowitz, 1952; Sarin & Weber, 1993; Weber et al., 2004), measures of gambling 
variability such as GR capture the notion of risk, we predicted that GR was associated with activity in 
anterior insula. 
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2. MATERIAL METHODS 
2.1 Participants 
Twenty-three healthy right-handed adults (13 females; aged 20-60, mean: 37, SD: 5) provided 
written consent to participate in the experiment. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. None had history of head injury, a diagnosis of any neurological or psychiatric condition 
(including any form of pathological gambling disorder, impulse control disorder or behavioural 
addiction), or were currently on medication affecting the central nervous system. The study was 
approved by the King’s College London Research Ethics Committee.  
 
2.2 Experimental paradigm and procedure 
During MRI scan, participants performed a computer-based task lasting approximately 40 minutes. 
On each trial (384 trials were run in total), a single monetary amount was presented on one side of 
the screen together with two different monetary amounts (one above the other) on the other side 
(sides were counterbalanced across trials). The single amount indicated a sure option and the pair of 
amounts indicated the two possible outcomes of a gamble. The two options always had equivalent 
EV. The EV was either a gain or loss (the text on the screen was coloured green and red during gain 
and loss trials, respectively) within the £5-£10 range (in £1 steps), with different EVs having equal 
frequency. The two possible outcomes of the gamble had always 0.5 probability. The difference 
between the two possible outcomes of the gamble (gamble range; GR) varied within the £1-£4 range 
(in £1 steps), with different GRs having equal frequency. EV and GR were manipulated orthogonally. 
After option presentation, participants chose either option by pressing the corresponding left or 
right button on a keypad. In some trials (feedback condition), the outcome was presented for one 
second immediately after choice, followed by an intertrial interval of one second. In other trials (no-
feedback condition) the outcome was not revealed, but a question mark was presented for one 
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second immediately after choice. EV and GR varied pseudorandomly trial by trial, while feedback 
and no-feedback trials were grouped in alternating blocks (each including 24 trials; whether the 
starting block was associated with feedback or no-feedback was counterbalanced across subjects). 
Note that EV, GR and feedback/no-feedback were orthogonal by design. We decided to organize the 
feedback and no-feedback trials in blocks as we reasoned this would help participants to remember 
whether a trial was followed by feedback or not. Before a transition from feedback to no-feedback 
condition (or vice versa) occurred, a panel on screen explicitly informed participants on whether 
outcome was provided or not in the upcoming block.   
Before playing the task, participants received a £30 monetary endowment. At the end of the 
experiment, one single trial was randomly selected and the associated outcome was either added to 
(for gains) or subtracted from (for losses) the endowment. Crucially, the trial could be selected from 
both feedback or no-feedback trials, implying these conditions were equally consequential.  
Data were collected at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience at King’s College 
London. Participants were first explicitly instructed about the task, the gamble probability, the 
difference between feedback and no-feedback conditions, and on how payment was derived. Inside 
the MRI scanner, a high-resolution structural brain scan was first recorded, followed by functional 
acquisition during task performance (organized in four different runs, each lasting about 10 
minutes). Subjects were paid after the scanning was completed. 
 
2.3 Behavioural analysis and computational modelling 
The main goal of our behavioural analyses was to establish whether gambling varies when 
comparing conditions where feedback is expected versus condition where feedback is not expected. 
This question can also arbitrate between different theories of choice. According to theories of 
anticipatory affect (Bell, 1985; Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005; 2007; Loomes & Sugden, 
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1986), participants expect that one of two contrasting feelings will be elicited by feedback, namely 
disappointment (elicited when an outcome is worse than expected) or elation (elicited when an 
outcome is better than expected). This view implies that such anticipatory feelings are evoked only 
during feedback trials, and not during no-feedback trials. It has been postulated that anticipatory 
disappointment and anticipatory elation have equal weight (Loomes & Sugden, 1986). In other 
words, according to this view, during choice an agent anticipates a feeling of disappointment as 
much as a feeling of elation, with the result that these two anticipatory feelings cancel each other 
out. In our task, this predicts that choice will not vary during feedback versus no-feedback trials. 
However, another proposal is that anticipation of disappointment usually prevails over anticipation 
of elation (Bell, 1985). This predicts that, in our task, individuals will gamble less during feedback 
compared to no-feedback trials, because expecting feedback would elicit anticipatory 
disappointment. An alternative perspective is endorsed by theories of curiosity (Baldassarre & 
Mirolli, 2013; Friston et al., 2015; Gottlieb, 2012; Gottlieb et al., 2014; Kidd & Hayden, 2015). These 
predict that gambling will increase during feedback trials, because feedback resolves uncertainty 
about which outcome has occurred in that trial.  
We were also interested in exploring an aspect of decision-making which is independent of the 
feedback manipulation, exploiting the fact that in or task EV and GR varied independently. Previous 
research which has manipulated these variables (Christopoulos et al., 2009; Tobler et al., 2009) has 
relied on standard choice models. These predict that the influence of EV and GR can be explained by 
a unique underlying factor, such as a non-linear value function as in expected utility theory (Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1945) and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), or risk sensitivity 
as in risk-return accounts (Markowitz, 1952; Sarin & Weber, 1993; Weber et al., 2004). By adopting a 
novel analysis approach (see below), we tested whether, in line with these models, a single factor 
was enough to characterize the combined influence of EV and GR, or whether an explanation based 
on multiple factors was necessary. 
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To address these questions, we adopted a model-based approach by fitting several alternative 
models of choice behaviour and compering them. We first estimated the following logistic 
regression model of choice (gambling was coded as one and no gambling was coded as zero), which 
we will refer to as Model one:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃(𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)
1−𝑃(𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)
) = µ + 𝛽𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐺𝑅 + 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑                (1) 
Where µ is an intercept parameter, 𝛽𝐸𝑉 captures the effect of the trial EV, 𝛽𝐺𝑅 captures the effect of 
the GR (this variable was rescaled to the mean), and 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 captures the effect of the feedback/no-
feedback condition (feed; coded assigning one to feedback and minus one to no-feedback). Note 
that EV, GR and feedback/no-feedback were orthogonal by design. To address some of our research 
questions and to perform some control analyses, Model one was compared against simpler models 
(i.e., where one or more parameters were fixed) as well as against more complex models (i.e., where 
additional parameters were included) (see Results, tab. 1 and tab. S1).  
Model one describes choice as arising from multiple factors, because EV and GR exert independent 
influences on choice, and because choice is also characterized by a baseline gambling tendency 
(captured by the intercept μ) which is independent of EV and GR. This contrasts with accounts based 
on either a non-linear value function or on risk-return models, which are based on the notion that a 
single factor drives choice. This raises the question of whether, in our task, choice was better 
characterised by Model one or by non-linear value function or risk-return models. To define these 
non-linear value function or risk-return models, let us consider an option x associated with a set of 
possible outcomes, each defined by a monetary amount 𝐴𝑘 that can be a gain (𝐴𝑔) or a loss (𝐴𝑔), 
and by its probability 𝑝𝑘 (either 𝑝𝑔 or 𝑝𝑙  for gains and losses, respectively). We considered models of 
choice based on a non-linear value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Rutledge et al., 2015; 
Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009), in which each option value 𝑉𝑥 is obtained as: 
𝑉𝑥 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑔 𝐴𝑔
𝛼 − 𝜆 ∑ 𝑝𝑙 (−𝐴𝑙)
𝛼             (2) 
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Where α is a free parameter capturing the curvature of the value function and λ is a free parameter 
capturing the weight of losses compared to gains (both parameters are larger than zero). A value of 
α < 1 describes a concave value function, while α > 1 describes a convex function. For λ < 1 and λ > 1, 
losses are weighted less and more than gains, respectively. We also considered models of choice 
based on risk-return (Markowitz, 1952; Sarin & Weber, 1993), in which 𝑉𝑥 corresponds to: 
𝑉𝑥 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑘 𝐴𝑘 + 𝜂 𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑥            (3) 
Where 𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑥 indicates the variance across outcomes of an option x, and η is a free parameter 
capturing whether (and how much) variance is attractive (and can be positive or negative, indicating 
variance is attractive or repulsive, respectively). We assessed also other risk-return accounts that 
follow equation 3 except that they use the coefficient of variation (Weber et al., 2004) or GR instead 
of variance.  
Models based on value function or risk-return prescribe that, after the value of the gamble 𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏 
and the value of the sure option 𝑉𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 are computed, the probability of gambling is obtained using 
logistic regression as: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃(𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)
1−𝑃(𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)
) = 𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏 − 𝑉𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒         (4) 
Note that, in our task, risk-return accounts are mathematically equivalent to logistic regression 
models having the variability of the gamble as single predictor. This is because, according to 
equation 3, the value of the sure option is 𝑉𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝐸𝑉, the value of the gamble is 𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏 = 𝐸𝑉 + 𝜂 
𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏, and hence the value difference is 𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏 − 𝑉𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝜂 𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏. From this, it is evident 
that the parameter 𝜂 is equivalent to the parameter 𝛽𝑉𝐴𝑅 in logistic regression. 
We fitted multiple models based on value function or risk-return accounts (for some, the parameter 
α or η was estimated separately for gain and loss trials) (tab. 2). These were compared with Model 
one. In some versions, we also included an extra parameter to account for previous literature 
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suggesting that gambling may exert an attraction or repulsion which is independent of the money at 
stake (Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2016b). If, for example, we consider a non-linear value function model, 
this extra parameter ω operates during estimation of 𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏 as follows: 
𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑔 𝐴𝑔
𝛼 − 𝜆 ∑ 𝑝𝑙 (−𝐴𝑙)
𝛼 + 𝜔                  (5) 
An important question is whether, like models relying on value function and risk-return, Model one 
can be formulated in terms of option evaluation, and here we offer such formulation. Let us assume 
that agents estimate the value of the sure option as 𝑉𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 =  𝐸𝑉, and the value of the gamble as:  
𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏 = µ + 𝜑𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐺𝑅 + 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑                (6) 
The parameter 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 captures the effect of feedback versus no-feedback condition. The parameter µ 
captures a gambling bias which is independent of EV and GR (higher value of µ boost the value of 
gambling). The parameter 𝛽𝐺𝑅 is analogous to the parameter η in risk-return accounts, and reports 
an attraction or repulsion for GR. The parameter 𝜑 reflects how much one relies on EV when 
calculating 𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏 compared to 𝑉𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡, and we can assume it is bounded between zero and two. If 
𝜑 < 1, EV is weighted less when estimating 𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏 compared to 𝑉𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒; if 𝜑 > 1, EV is weighted more 
when estimating 𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏 compared to 𝑉𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡 (if 𝜑 = 1, EV is weighted equally). We can write the value 
difference between the two options as follows: 
𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏 − 𝑉𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡 =  µ + (𝜑 − 1)𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐺𝑅 + 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑                      (7) 
This is equivalent to equation one if we set 𝛽𝐸𝑉 = 𝜑 − 1. Note that 𝛽𝐸𝑉 can be positive or negative, 
and can be interpreted as reflecting whether one weights more EV when computing 𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏 (𝛽𝐸𝑉 >
1) or when computing 𝑉𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡 (𝛽𝐸𝑉 < 1). 
Models were fitted separately for each participant. Parameters were estimated with Matlab, and 
specifically using the glmfit function for logistic regression models, and the fminsearchbound 
function for models based on value function or on risk return accounts. Parameter estimation was 
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unconstrained except for the non-linear value function parameter α and the loss weight parameter 
λ, which were bounded to be positive. After parameters were estimated, the log-likelihood of the 
data given the model was calculated and summed across participants. This was used to derive the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which approximates the posterior probability of the model 
given the data (the better the model the lower the BIC score).  
 
2.4 fMRI scanning and analysis 
The task was programmed using the Cogent toolbox (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging) in 
Matlab. Visual stimuli were back projected onto a translucent screen positioned behind the bore of 
the magnet and viewed via an angled mirror. Blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast 
functional images were acquired with echo-planar T2*-weighted (EPI) imaging using a Siemens Trio 
3-Tesla MR system with a 16 channel head coil. The whole brain was covered by images comprising 
40 interleaved 3-mm-thick sagittal slices (in-plane resolution = 3 x 3 mm; time to echo = 30 ms; 
repetition time = 2 s; flip angle = 75°; field of view = 240mm). The first six volumes were discarded to 
allow for T1 equilibration effects. T1-weighted structural images were acquired at a 1 x 1 x 1 mm 
resolution (time to echo = 3.016 ms; repetition time = 7.312 ms; flip angle = 11°; field of view = 
270mm). Functional MRI data were analysed using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) version 12 
(Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging). Data preprocessing included spatial realignment, slice 
timing correction, normalization and smoothing. Specifically, functional volumes were realigned to 
the mean volume, were spatially normalized to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
template with a 3 x 3 x 3 voxel size, and were smoothed with 8 mm Gaussian kernel. High-pass 
filtering with a cut-off of 128 s and AR(1)-model were applied.  
Blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) response was modelled with a canonical hemodynamic 
response function and a general linear model (GLM) including, when options were presented, one 
 13 
 
stick function regressor modulated by (i) choice (a binary variable assigning one to gambling and 
minus one to sure choices), (ii) EV, (iii) GR, (iv) feedback (a binary variable assigning one to feedback 
and minus one to no-feedback condition), (v) the EV-choice interaction, (vi) the GR-choice 
interaction, (vii) the choice-feedback interaction, (viii) the GR-feedback interaction, and (ix) RTs (as 
effect of no interest). For feedback trials, two stick function regressors were also included at the 
time of outcome, the first for choices of the gamble (modulated by a RPE; i.e., the difference 
between outcome and EV), the second for choices of the sure option. The GLM also included six 
motion parameters as nuisance regressors. Please see SI for arguments ruling out any potential 
collinearity among regressors, for example among regressors at the time of option presentation and 
regressors at the time of outcome. SI also describes additional fMRI analyses based on a different 
GLM to explore on the feedback-EV and feedback-GR interaction. 
Contrasts of interest were computed subject by subject, and used for second-level (between 
subjects) one-sample t-tests and Pearson correlations using standard summary statistic approach (in 
analyses reported below, age and gender were not adopted as covariates; however, similar results 
were obtained when age and gender were also included as covariates – results not shown). All 
analyses below examine the time of option presentation (the time of feedback was not the focus of 
the study). Statistical (small volume corrected – SVC) tests focused on the ventral striatum, vmPFC 
and anterior insula as ROIs. The ventral striatum and vmPFC are two primary structures involved in 
processing the value of options (Bartra et al., 2013; Boorman et al., 2009; 2013; Fitzgerald et al., 
2009; Hunt et al., 2012; Rigoli et al., 2016a; Strait el al., 2014), while anterior insula is a key region 
for processing aspects of risk (Mohr et al., 2010; Payzan-LeNestour et al., 2013; Paulus et al., 2003; 
Preuschoff et al., 2008; Rigoli et al., 2016a; Rudorf et al., 2012). ROIs were defined a spheres having 
10mm radius, and were centred on coordinates derived from previous literature (note this produced 
ROIs including only grey matter voxels). We were interested in examining striatum and vmPFC, given 
their central role in processing EV (Bartra et al., 2013). Hence, for striatum (coordinates: 12, 10, -6 
and -12, 12, -6) and vmPFC (coordinates: 2, 46, -8), prior centre coordinates were extracted from a 
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recent metanalysis on fMRI and EV encoding (see tab. 1 in Bartra et al., 2013). We were also 
interested in examining the role of anterior insula in processing risk. At present a metanalysis about 
risk processing in this region is not available in the literature. Hence, prior centre coordinates 
(coordinates: 30, 26, -2 and -30, 29, 1) were extracted from a recent study that used a similar design 
to examine aspects of decision-making under risk (Rigoli et al., 2016a). For striatum and insula, a 
separate ROI was considered for each hemisphere. Statistics of ROIs were SVC using a voxel-wise 
approach (i.e., considering each single voxel individually). In order to obtain a total family wise error 
(FWE) rate of p < 0.05 among all five ROIs combined, a Bonferroni correction was adopted by using p 
< 0.01 SVC as significance threshold applied to each ROI individually. For exploratory purposes, we 
also report data for other brain regions with statistics having p < 0.001 uncorrected significance (tab. 
S3). 
 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Behaviour 
We first assessed whether participants were risk seeking or risk averse in the different conditions 
(see SI for analyses of reaction times (RTs)). Gambling percentage was not different from 50% during 
feedback trials (mean = 52%, t(22) = 0.66, p = 0.515; two-tailed p < 0.05 was used as significance 
criterion for behavioural analyses), while a significance trend toward gambling less than 50% 
emerged during no-feedback trials (mean = 42%; t(22) = -1.82, p = 0.082). Gambling percentage was 
not different from 50% during gain trials (mean = 53%; t(22) = 0.68, p = 0.506) and was lower than 
50% during loss trials (mean = 41%; t(22) = -2.15, p = 0.043). We analysed differences across 
conditions performing an ANOVA of gambling percentage with feedback/no-feedback and gain/loss 
as factors (fig. 1B). This showed a higher gambling for feedback versus no-feedback trials (F(1,22) = 
17.61, p < 0.001) and for gain versus loss (F(1,22) = 5.54, p = 0.028), with no interaction (F(1,22) = 
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0.21, p = 0.653). The observation of a higher gambling during feedback trials is consistent with 
predictions derived from curiosity theories (Baldassarre & Mirolli, 2013; Friston et al., 2015; Gottlieb, 
2012; Gottlieb et al., 2014; Kidd & Hayden, 2015), but does not fit with theories emphasising the role 
of expected disappointment (Bell, 1985). 
An increased gambling for gains compared to losses, a lack of risk aversion for gains, and risk 
aversion for losses are observations which do not fit with prevailing choice models (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1945). However, these results are consistent with 
studies adopting similar task designs (for an enhanced gambling for gains compared to losses, see 
Ludvig & Spetch, 2011; Rutledge et al., 2015; for a lack of risk aversion for gains, see Rigoli et al., 
2016a; 2016b; for risk aversion for losses, see Ludvig & Spetch, 2011; Rutledge et al., 2015). A 
possibility is that this pattern emerges when small monetary amounts are at stake as potential gains 
or losses (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991). 
To probe further our data, we fitted alternative models of choice and compared them (see 
Methods). Model one (see Methods) showed a lower BIC score compared to simpler models in 
which one or more parameters were set to zero (tab. 1). Furthermore, Model one was compared 
with more complex versions which included also a gain/loss factor (coded assigning one to gains and 
zero to losses), which in some models interacted with EV, GR, or feedback/no feedback (tab. 1), and 
models where feedback/no feedback interacted with EV or GR. These more complex models had 
larger BIC (tab. 1). This model comparison analysis supports Model one over alternative accounts. 
Note that Model one implements 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 as free parameter, which indicates that participants’ choice 
varied based on feedback condition. Consistent with the ANOVA above, the parameter 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 was 
significantly larger than zero (mean = 0.31; t(22) = 4.34, p < 0.001), reflecting an increased gambling 
for feedback versus no-feedback condition.  
Model one characterizes the effect of feedback condition using a binary variable, which describes 
the belief of whether feedback is expected or not. However, because feedback and no-feedback 
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conditions were organized in blocks, the feedback effect could potentially result from an influence of 
outcomes collected before (and not from expectations about feedback). We considered this 
analysing the influence of the outcome collected at the previous trial, focusing on its associated 
value or on its associated reward prediction error (RPE; i.e., the outcome value minus the EV). We 
estimated logistic regression models of choice similar to Model one in which either the value or RPE 
of the previous outcome was included as additional predictor (note that this predictor has a value of 
zero for no-feedback trials) or replaced the feedback/no-feedback binary predictor (tab. S1). In some 
models, we assumed different influences for gains and losses or for positive and negative RPEs. For 
example, in one model the previous outcome value was set to zero when it was a loss. Other models 
used the unsigned value or unsigned RPE associated to the previous outcome. Finally, we assessed 
models implementing the interaction between the value of the previous outcome (considering, for 
some models, its absolute value and, for other models, considering exclusively either losses or gains) 
and choice, the latter indicating whether a sure option or a gamble was chosen at the previous trial 
(note that the interaction between RPE and choice cannot be modelled, because RPE is always zero 
when the sure option is selected). All models implementing an influence of the previous outcome 
reported a BIC score larger than Model one (tab. S1), indicating it is unlikely that participants were 
influenced by the previous outcome. To ascertain further that the effect of feedback condition was 
not confounded by any influence of the previous outcome, we tested 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 (the regressor 
associated with feedback condition) also for models implementing the role of outcome, and results 
confirmed that this parameter remained significant (e.g., for the model implementing RPE at 
previous trial: t(22) = 4.22, p < 0.001; results not shown for other models). Altogether, analyses on 
the influence of previous outcome support the notion that the effect of feedback condition depends 
on an expectation about whether feedback will be available or not, and it is not confounded by 
learning.  
Next, we compared Model one against value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1945) or risk-return accounts (Markowitz, 1952; Sarin & Weber, 1993; Weber et al., 
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2004) (see Methods). Different versions of these accounts were considered during model 
comparison (see Methods and tab. 2). These showed a BIC score higher than Model one, suggesting 
they provide a worse explanation of our data (tab. 2; see SI and tab. S2 for an analysis of simulated 
data which clarifies why non-linear value function or risk-return models poorly explain choice in our 
task). This suggests that, contrary to value function or risk-return accounts, a single factor is not 
enough to explain choice in our task, but that multiple factors are at play (as implicated by Model 
one). 
Overall, Model one emerged as the best account of choice behaviour. This shows that gambling 
resulted from four independent components, namely a gambling bias (captured by the intercept µ), 
a component dependent on EV, one dependent on GR, and one reflecting the presence or absence 
of feedback. Note that the observation that choice behaviour was affected by these different 
variables characterising the different trials indicates that participants overall felt that their choices 
were consequential, in other words that participants were (at least to some degree) motivated 
during the task. Note also that the gambling bias is formally equivalent to the total gambling 
proportion, as confirmed by the almost perfect correlation between the two (r(21) = 0.9956; p < 
0.001). Consistent with the notion that EV and GR exerted an independent influence on choice, the 
associated parameters 𝛽𝐸𝑉 and 𝛽𝐺𝑅 were uncorrelated across participants (fig. 1C; r(21) = -0.058, p = 
793). Also, these parameters were not correlated with a baseline gambling bias µ (fig. S1; 𝛽𝐸𝑉: r(21) 
= 0.231, p = 0.288; 𝛽𝐺𝑅: r(21) = -0.125, p = 0.573), nor with the effect of feedback 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 (fig. S1; 𝛽𝐸𝑉: 
r(21) = 0.168, p = 0.445; 𝛽𝐺𝑅 : r(21) = 0.064, p = 0.772). A significance trend emerged when exploring 
the relationship between µ and 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 (fig. S1; r(21) = -0.354, p = 0.098).  
An important question is whether the parameters estimated for Model one are reliable. For 
example, can we reliably infer that a participant is less affected by feedback compared to another 
participant? To assess this, for each participant we randomly split trials in two groups, and Model 
one was estimated from each trial group. All parameters estimated from the two trial groups were 
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correlated across participants (fig. S2; µ: r(21) = 0.959 , p < 0.001; 𝛽𝐸𝑉: r(21) = 0.955 , p < 0.001; 𝛽𝐺𝑅:  
r(21) = 0.956, p < 0.001; 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑: r(21) = 0.776 , p < 0.001), indicating that the parameters were 
reliable, and that the individual differences across participants were meaningful and not due to 
chance.  
To assess whether the effects exerted by the different factors were similar across participants (e.g., 
whether participants on average gambled more for larger EVs), we performed one-sample t-tests on 
the estimated parameters (see above for this test regarding 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑). We did not find any difference 
from zero for µ (mean = -0.22; t(22) = -1.06, p = 0.321) nor for 𝛽𝐺𝑅 (fig 1D; mean = -0.06; t(22) = -
0.42, p = 0.689). An average parameter larger than zero was observed for 𝛽𝐸𝑉 (fig. 1E; mean = 0.04; 
t(22) = 2.25, p = 0.035), indicating an increased gambling for higher EVs (consistent with the effect of 
gain versus loss found in the ANOVA). In sum, our behavioural results highlight an increased 
gambling when feedback is provided, and show that both the EV and the GR each exert an 
independent influence in our gambling task. 
 
3.2 Neuroimaging 
Our computational model-based analysis allowed us to estimate, for each subject, different 
components driving choice behaviour in our task, namely a baseline propensity component, an EV-
related component, a GR-related component, and a feedback-related component. We characterized 
the neural processes associated with these. To this aim, we probed the relationship between 
individual differences in gambling behaviour and BOLD response. Identifying a relationship in a 
certain brain region for a specific component of gambling would suggest the region is involved in 
that component. 
We fitted a GLM to BOLD data (see Methods) having one stick function regressor at the time of 
option presentation modulated by (i) choice (a binary variable assigning one to gambling and minus 
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one to sure choices), (ii) EV, (iii) GR, (iv) feedback (a binary variable assigning one to feedback and 
minus one to no-feedback), (v) the EV-choice interaction, (vi) the GR-choice interaction, (vii) the 
choice-feedback interaction, and (viii) RTs (as effect of no interest). For feedback trials, two stick 
function regressors were also included at the time of outcome, the first for choices of the gamble 
(modulated by a RPE), the second for choices of the sure option (see SI for considerations ruling out 
any potential collinearity among regressors). All our analyses below examine the time of option 
presentation (the time of feedback was not the focus of the study). 
We first probed the neural processes implicated in an increased gambling during feedback trials. 
Previous research has shown that, when options are presented, response in ventral striatum 
encodes the value of the chosen option (Bartra et al., 2013). This raises the possibility of a stronger 
striatal response during feedback compared to no-feedback trials when a gamble is chosen, given 
that (according to our behavioural results) gambling is more attractive when feedback is provided. 
Specifically, during feedback compared to no-feedback trials, we predicted a stronger striatal 
response at option presentation for gambling compared to sure choices. This was assessed 
considering the choice-feedback interaction term of the BOLD GLM (i.e., the term of the GLM 
numbered as vii). Data confirmed our predictions, indicating that, comparing feedback and no-
feedback trials, response for gambling versus sure choices increased in bilateral ventral striatum (fig. 
2A; left: -12, 8, -2; Z = 4.71; p < 0.001 SVC; right: 9, 8, 1; Z = 4.21; p = 0.001 SVC). Moreover, a trend 
towards a positive correlation emerged between the behavioural effect of feedback condition 
(captured by the parameter 𝛽𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑 in the logistic regression model of choice) and this neural effect in 
right, but not left (p > 0.01 SVC), ventral striatum (fig. 2B; 15, 17, -2; Z = 3.04; r(21) = 0.614; p = 0.039 
SVC). Although this emerged only as a trend, this results suggests that the more a participant 
gambled for feedback compared to no feedback trials, the more striatal response for gambling 
versus sure choices increased during feedback compared to no-feedback trials. Note this effect 
occurs at option presentation and is not confounded by the outcome, since the GLM adopted 
includes specific regressors at outcome presentation (see SI for further analyses on this point).    
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To investigate the neural processes underlying an EV-dependent gambling preference, we focused 
on ventral striatum and vmPFC. While, when options are presented, response in ventral striatum 
encodes the EV of the chosen option (Bartra et al., 2013), previous research suggests that vmPFC 
signals a difference in EV across options (Bartra et al., 2013; Boorman et al., 2009; 2013; Fitzgerald et 
al., 2009; Hunt et al., 2012; Rigoli et al., 2016a; Strait el al., 2014). The model of choice outlined 
above (Model one) can be formulated in such a way that the EV-dependent gambling preference 
emerges from subtracting the value of the sure option from the value of the gamble (see Methods). 
This is a form of value difference similar to the signal expressed in vmPFC, predicting the latter 
region could be involved in establishing an EV-related gambling preference. Consistent with previous 
reports (Bartra et al., 2013), we found a positive relationship between EV and activity in ventral 
striatum (left: -9, 8, -8; Z = 4.43; p < 0.001 SVC; right: 9, 20, -2; Z = 4.10; p = 0.002 SVC; Montreal 
Neurological Institute coordinates were used), but not in vmPFC (p > 0.01 SVC). We analysed the 
correlation across individuals between this brain effect and the effect of EV on gambling preference 
𝛽𝐸𝑉. We found a trend towards a negative relationship in vmPFC (fig. 3; 12, 41, -11; Z = 3.13; r(21) = -
0.616; p = 0.033 SVC). Although this emerges only as a trend, this result indicates that, for 
participants who gambled more for positive EVs, activity in vmPFC increased for negative compared 
to positive EVs; for participants who gambled more for negative EVs, activity in vmPFC increased for 
positive compared to negative EVs (fig. 3C). No relationship was observed in ventral striatum (p > 
0.01 SVC). Previous literature suggests that, at option presentation, vmPFC response reflects the 
value difference between the chosen and the unchosen option (Bartra et al., 2013; Boorman et al., 
2009; 2013; Fitzgerald et al., 2009; Hunt et al., 2012; Rigoli et al., 2016a; Strait el al., 2014). In our 
task, this predicts that, for participants who gamble more for negative EVs, the relationship between 
EV and vmPFC activity should be positive during sure choices, and negative during gambling. Vice 
versa, for participants who gamble more for positive EVs, the relationship between EV and vmPFC 
activity should be negative during sure choices, and positive during gambling. We investigated this 
analysing the EV-choice interaction term of the BOLD GLM (i.e., the term of the GLM numbered as 
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v). Contrary to predictions based on previous literature (Bartra et al., 2013; Boorman et al., 2009; 
2013; Fitzgerald et al., 2009; Hunt et al., 2012; Rigoli et al., 2016a; Strait el al., 2014), in vmPFC this 
interaction term was not significantly different from zero and was not correlated with an EV-related 
gambling propensity 𝛽𝐸𝑉 (p > 0.01 SVC). No effect emerged in ventral striatum too (p > 0.01 SVC).  
Evidence indicates that, in humans, anterior insula appears as one of the main brain regions 
implicated in processing aspects of risk (Mohr et al., 2010; Payzan-LeNestour et al., 2013; Paulus et 
al., 2003; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Rigoli et al., 2016a; Rudorf et al., 2012). Specifically, an association 
has been reported between activity in this region and measures of risk linked with the probability of 
future outcomes (Mohr et al., 2010; Payzan-LeNestour et al., 2013; Paulus et al., 2003; Preuschoff et 
al., 2008; Rigoli et al., 2016a; Rudorf et al., 2012). However, so far fMRI studies on risky decision-
making have operationalized risk in terms of outcome probability only (note that, as in our study, 
also in previous studies on risk outcomes were irrelevant for learning). The role of other components 
of risk, such as GR or similar measures of outcome variability, remains poorly understood. Our 
design allowed us to investigate this question. We considered the hypothesis that insula reflects the 
total level of expected risk, which, according to influential economic models (Markowitz, 1952; Sarin 
& Weber, 1993; Weber et al., 2004), increases (i) during gambling choices, (ii) when options have 
higher GR, and (iii) when a gamble characterized by higher GR is chosen. To test this, we first 
compared insula response for gambling versus sure choices, and, consistent with previous reports 
(Rigoli et al., 2016a), we observed an increase (fig. 4A; left: -33, 17, -8; Z = 3.59; p = 0.009 SVC; right: 
33, 20, -5; Z = 4.71; p < 0.001). Second, we analysed the relationship between insula response and 
GR, and found a positive correlation (fig 4; left: -33, 23, -5; Z = 3.66; p = 0.008 SVC; right: 42, 20, -5; Z 
= 3.68; p = 0.008 SVC). Third, we considered the GR-choice interaction term of the BOLD GLM (i.e., 
the term of the GLM numbered as vi). This was larger than zero in insula (fig. 4; left: -30, 26, -8; Z = 
3.64; p = 0.008 SVC; on the right side this emerged only as a trend: 45, 32, -2; Z = 3.03; p = 0.042 
SVC), implying that the relationship between GR and insula response was stronger during gambling 
compared to sure choices. Altogether, these results support the hypothesis that insula integrates 
 22 
 
multiple elements of risk, in particular about whether a selected option is probabilistic or not and 
about the variability of its possible outcomes.  
Previous research has reported a link between gambling preferences and insula activity (Rudorf et 
al., 2012). However, in previous studies insula was not recorded during task performance. Therefore, 
an open question is whether the risk signal found in insula during task performance is implicated in 
gambling preferences. To address this question, we first asked whether insula response for gambling 
versus sure choices is related with a baseline gambling propensity, captured by the intercept of the 
logistic regression model of choice µ. Across participants, we found a negative correlation (fig. 5A-B; 
right: 39, 17, -8; Z = 3.94; r(21) = -0.728; p = 0.003 SVC; a trend towards significance emerged in left 
insula: -33, 20, -5; Z = 2.80; r(21) = -0.563 p = 0.074 SVC), implying insula response for gambling 
compared to sure choices was larger for individuals who exhibited lower baseline gambling 
propensity. Second, we examined the relationship between response to GR in insula and the GR-
related gambling propensity 𝛽𝐺𝑅, but no correlation emerged (p > 0.01 SVC). Third, we explored the 
relationship between the GR-choice interaction effect in insula and the GR-related gambling 
propensity 𝛽𝐺𝑅 (as estimated from choice behaviour). A trend towards significance for a negative 
correlation emerged (fig. 5A-C; left: -33, 29, -5; Z = 3.39; r(21) = -0.655; p = 0.016 SVC; right: 42, 29, -
2; Z = 3.35; r(21) = -0.649; p = 0.018 SVC). This suggests that, when comparing gambling and sure 
choices, the association between GR and insula response was stronger for participants who, at the 
behavioural level, preferred gambling for smaller GRs. Altogether, these results highlight a link 
between risk signalling in insula and risk preferences. They indicate that insula response to a specific 
aspect of risk (e.g., when a gamble is selected) is amplified if that aspect is perceived as aversive 
(e.g., if gambling is usually avoided). 
In summary, our fMRI analyses identify specific neural substrates associated with the different 
components of gambling that guide choice behaviour in our task. When a gamble is chosen 
(compared to sure choices), striatal activation at option presentation was higher during feedback 
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compared to no-feedback trials. A preference to gamble dependent on EV was related with an effect 
of EV on vmPFC activity. Insula response increased for gamble compared to sure choices and was 
associated with GR, an association that was stronger during gambling compared to sure choices. In 
addition, effects on insula were linked with individual gambling preferences, as the increase in insula 
activity for gamble compared to sure choices was stronger in participants who gambled less, and the 
association between GR and insula response was stronger during gambling for participants who 
preferred gambling with small GR. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
We examined the role of expecting feedback, and we found this increased gambling. At option 
presentation, expecting feedback was associated with increased striatal activity when a gamble was 
being selected. EV and GR exerted independent influences on gambling in a way that was 
inconsistent with both non-linear value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1945) and risk-return accounts (Markowitz, 1952; Sarin & Weber, 1993; Weber et al., 
2004). The effects of EV and GR on choice mapped to distinct neural processes reflected in vmPFC 
and in anterior insula activity at option presentation, respectively.  
Our observation of an increased gambling during feedback trials is hard to explain as being the 
consequence of anticipatory disappointment (Bell, 1985). However, this finding fits with current 
models of curiosity (Baldassarre & Mirolli, 2013; Friston et al., 2015; Gottlieb, 2012; Gottlieb et al., 
2014; Kidd & Hayden, 2015). Epistemic value is a central concept of curiosity theories (e.g., Friston et 
al., 2015) and corresponds to a form of value which favours information seeking (and hence 
uncertainty reduction) even when this is not helpful for reward collection. A critical aspect of our 
task is that feedback was not instrumental, in other words it did not facilitate reward collection in 
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the future. Hence, our findings suggest that epistemic value associated with expecting feedback 
facilitates gambling. 
Previous research has examined decision-making under risk in contexts where agents are not 
explicitly informed about possible outcomes and probabilities, but have to learn these from their 
past experience (Barron & Erev, 2003; FitzGerald et al., 2010; Glaser et al., 2012; Hertwig et al., 
2004; Jessup et al., 2008; Ludvig & Spetch, 2011; Lejarraga & Gonzalez, 2011; Wu et al., 2011; Wulff 
et al., 2018). Crucially, in this research feedback was instrumental for learning and for reward 
maximization, as it allowed participants to acquire knowledge about outcomes and probabilities. The 
fact that learning was engaged implies that previous studies were unable to assess whether 
individuals are attracted by feedback information even when this information is irrelevant for 
performance. On the contrary, given that participants were explicitly informed about outcomes and 
probabilities, our task does not involve any learning (this is supported by analyses demonstrating 
that the previous outcomes did not influence choice). This allowed us to show that individuals are 
attracted by feedback information even when this information is irrelevant. Our findings also help in 
interpreting previous observations (Ludvig & Spetch, 2011). Comparing decisions from experience 
(i.e., based on learning) versus decisions from instruction (the latter occurring when option 
consequences are described explicitly), an increased gambling has been reported in a task analogous 
to the one used here (Ludvig & Spetch, 2011). Our study raises the possibility that this previous 
observation could be explained by an attractiveness of feedback, irrespective of any learning. 
Recording fMRI data during task performance allowed us to shed light on the neural mechanisms 
underlying the effect of expecting feedback on choice. Increased gambling during feedback trials 
reflected a higher value placed on gambling in this condition. This increased value was expressed in 
the ventral striatal response at option presentation – at a time when this region encodes the value 
of the chosen option (Bartra et al., 2013). Previous literature has asked whether the ventral striatum 
is implicated in processing the value of information. An indirect evidence of this is the observation 
 25 
 
that, when an individual is waiting for an answer to a question about general knowledge, activity in 
ventral striatum increases with the reported level of curiosity (Kang et al., 2009). However, given 
that this previous study did not require any choice behaviour, it remains unclear whether reported 
curiosity reflects subjective value. By adopting a choice task, our study provides direct evidence that 
the ventral striatum processes a value of information which motivates choice behaviour. Another 
study found the striatum to encode a novelty value signal, which favours exploration of newly 
presented options in a decision-making task (Wittmann et al., 2008). However, in that study 
exploration was instrumental to reward maximization, as it allowed participants to familiarize with 
novel options and hence to maximize reward collection in the long run. On the contrary, our study 
relies on a task where feedback information was unhelpful for obtaining more reward in the future. 
Hence our findings highlight an involvement of the ventral striatum in processing a value of 
information in conditions where information is irrelevant for reward maximization. This signal in the 
striatum fits with the notion of epistemic value (e.g., Friston et al., 2015), corresponding to a form of 
value which favours information seeking even when this is not helpful for reward collection. 
Classical theories of decision-making under risk based on value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1945) or risk-return accounts (Markowitz, 1952; Sarin & Weber, 
1993; Weber et al., 2004) offered a relatively poor explanation of the choice data in our task. First, 
as already highlighted by previous research using similar paradigms (Rigoli et al, 2016a; 2016b), 
these models were unable to capture a baseline gambling preference (corresponding to the 
intercept of the logistic regression model) independent of EV or GR. Second, they were unable to 
account for the fact that EV and GR each exerted an independent influence on gambling. To our 
knowledge, this is the first demonstration that, at least in selected tasks, the models based on value 
function or risk return fail to describe the impact of EV and GR (or similar indexes of risk). The data 
were better explained by a simple logistic regression account comprising a gambling bias, an EV-
related influence, and a GR-related influence as factors (in addition to the effect of feedback 
condition). This model is analogous to previous accounts of multi-attribute decisions (EV and GR 
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corresponding to two distinct attributes) in which each attribute contributes independently to 
choice (Tsetsos et al., 2016).  
Activity in vmPFC correlated positively with EV for participants who gambled more for negative EVs, 
and correlated negatively with EV for participants who gambled more for positive EVs. Previous 
research suggests that vmPFC response signals the value difference between the chosen and 
unchosen option (Bartra et al., 2013; Boorman et al., 2009; 2013; Fitzgerald et al., 2009; Hunt et al., 
2012; Rigoli et al., 2016a; Strait el al., 2014). Contrary to this, in our task the relationship between 
the effect of EV on vmPFC response and an EV-related gambling preference did not differ during 
gambling and sure choices. Instead, our results suggest vmPFC signalled a difference between the 
sure option and the gamble, independent of which option was eventually chosen. Note that, 
contrary to most previous studies, in our task sure options and gambles represent two clear distinct 
option categories. A possibility is that, when clear option categories can be identified, vmPFC activity 
anchors to one category, in our case the sure option. As a result, independent of the option 
eventually selected, activity in vmPFC would signal the difference between the reference option 
category and other categories, in our case corresponding to the difference between the sure option 
and the gamble. This offers a testable hypothesis of vmPFC activity that could be explored in the 
future. 
Our study contributes to shedding light on the neural processes underlying decision-making under 
risk (Christopoulos et al., 2009; D’Acremont & Bossaerts, 2008; Mohr et al., 2010; Paulus et al., 2003; 
Payzan-LeNestour et al., 2013; Preuschoff et al., 2006; 2008; Rigoli et al., 2016a; Rudorf et al., 2012; 
Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Symmonds et al., 2010; Tobler et al., 2009). Specifically, it extends 
research on the role of the anterior insula in this domain (Mohr et al., 2010; Payzan-LeNestour et al., 
2013; Paulus et al., 2003; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Rigoli et al., 2016a; Rudorf et al., 2012). Our results 
contribute to clarify which aspects of risk are reflected in insula activity, demonstrating a connection 
between insula activation and individual risk preferences. Consistent with previous reports (Rigoli et 
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al., 2016a), higher insula activity was observed during gambling compared to sure choices. 
Moreover, response in this region correlated with GR, and this effect was stronger during gambling 
compared to sure choices. In addition to encoding aspects of risk related with outcome probability 
(Mohr et al., 2010; Payzan-LeNestour et al., 2013; Paulus et al., 2003; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Rigoli 
et al., 2016a; Rudorf et al., 2012), this demonstrates that insula also processes information about 
outcome variability. In summary, these findings show that insula signals an overall risk expectancy 
integrating information about whether an option is probabilistic or not and about the variability of 
its possible outcomes. Although previous research has shown a link between individual risk 
preferences and insula response (Rudorf et al., 2012), this region was not recorded directly during 
decision-making. Therefore, previous research has left open the question whether insula activity 
during a gambling task is linked with individual strategies adopted in that task. We investigated this 
question and found that participants with a low gambling propensity showed a stronger insula 
response when comparing gambling and sure choices. Moreover, when comparing gambling and 
sure choices, participants who preferred gambling with low GR exhibited a stronger relationship 
between insula response and GR. Altogether, these results highlight a connection between insula 
response during task performance and gambling preferences. They indicate that the insula response 
to a specific aspect of risk (e.g., when a gamble is selected) is amplified if that aspect is perceived as 
aversive (e.g., if gambling is usually avoided). For example, participants who gamble less (i.e., those 
exhibiting a decreased average gambling propensity) may avoid gambling because they perceive it as 
an aversive option. According to our data, these participants also tend to show stronger insula 
response during gambling, which is putatively aversive. Hence, insula activity may reflect aspects of 
risk especially when these aspects are perceived as aversive. 
In summary, our study shows that EV and GR each exerted an independent impact on gambling. This 
observation is difficult to reconcile with traditional value function and risk-return models of choice. 
Signalling of EV and GR was segregated in the brain, as these quantities were associated with activity 
in vmPFC and insula, respectively. These results supports the notion that, at least in certain decision 
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contexts, EV and GR are evaluated independently to form choice. A central finding of our study is 
that gambling increases when feedback is provided, an effect associated with increased striatal 
response during gambling when comparing feedback and no-feedback trials.  
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Model Free parameters Neg log-lik BIC Exp(Log lik/n trials) 
1** µ, 𝛽𝐸𝑉 , 𝛽𝐺𝑅 , 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑   4550 9647 0.5933 
2 Random 6042 12083 0.5000 
3 µ 5479 11095 0.5333 
4 𝛽𝐸𝑉 5706 11548 0.5196 
5 𝛽𝐺𝑅  5517 11171 0.5310 
6 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  5943 12022 0.5057 
7 µ, 𝛽𝐸𝑉 5111 10496 0.5563 
8 µ, 𝛽𝐺𝑅  5078 10430 0.5584 
9 µ, 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  5358 10990 0.5408 
10 𝛽𝐸𝑉 , 𝛽𝐺𝑅  5158 10588 0.5533 
11 𝛽𝐸𝑉 , 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  5602 11478 0.5259 
12 𝛽𝐺𝑅 , 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  5400 11072 0.5382 
13 µ, 𝛽𝐸𝑉 , 𝛽𝐺𝑅  4687 9784 0.5841 
14 µ, 𝛽𝐸𝑉 , 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  4984 10377 0.5645 
15 µ, 𝛽𝐺𝑅 , 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  4950 10311 0.5667 
16 𝛽𝐸𝑉 , 𝛽𝐺𝑅 , 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  5032 10474 0.5614 
17 µ, 𝛽𝐸𝑉 , 𝛽𝐺𝑅 , 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 , 𝛽𝐺𝐿  4506 9695 0.5963 
18 µ, 𝛽𝐸𝑉 , 𝛽𝐺𝑅 , 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 , 𝛽𝐺𝐿,𝐸𝑉 4530 9742 0.5947 
19 µ, 𝛽𝐸𝑉 , 𝛽𝐺𝑅 , 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 , 𝛽𝐺𝐿,𝐺𝑅  4521 9725 0.5953 
20 µ, 𝛽𝐸𝑉 , 𝛽𝐺𝑅 , 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 , 𝛽𝐺𝐿,𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  4512 9706 0.5959 
21 µ, 𝛽𝐸𝑉 , 𝛽𝐺𝑅 , 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 , 𝛽𝐸𝑉,𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  4518 9719 0.5955 
22 µ, 𝛽𝐸𝑉 , 𝛽𝐺𝑅 , 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 , 𝛽𝐺𝑅,𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  4533 9750 0.5945 
 
Tab. 1. Model comparison analysis of logistic regression models. Free parameters are reported in column two 
and can include, in addition to an intercept µ, coefficients associated with EV ( 𝛽𝐸𝑉), GR ( 𝛽𝐺𝑅), with binary 
predictors feedback/no-feedback ( 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑) or gain/loss (𝛽𝐺𝐿), with the interaction between gain/loss and EV 
(𝛽𝐺𝐿,𝐸𝑉), GR (𝛽𝐺𝐿,𝐺𝑅), or feedback/no-feedback (𝛽𝐺𝐿,𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑), and with the interaction between feedback/no-
feedback and EV (𝛽𝐸𝑉,𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑) or GR (𝛽𝐺𝑅,𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑). The third and fourth columns report the negative log-likelihood 
and BIC score summed across participants, respectively. The fifth column reports the exponential of the log-
likelihood divided by the total number of trials across participants. This quantity can be interpreted as the 
proportion of trials correctly predicted by the model. The model with lowest BIC score (Model one) is marked 
with asterisks. 
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Model Free parameters Neg log-lik BIC Exp(Log lik/n trials) 
1** µ, 𝛽𝐸𝑉 , 𝛽𝐺𝑅 , 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑   4550 9647 0.5933 
2 𝛼 5955 12046 0.5050 
3 α, λ 5707 11686 0.5196 
4 𝛼𝐿,𝛼𝐺 , λ 5440 11490 0.5296 
5 𝛼𝐿,𝛼𝐺 , λ, 𝜔 5112 10771 0.5563 
6 𝛼𝐿,𝛼𝐺 , λ, 𝜔, 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  4992 10666 0.5640 
7 𝜂 (VAR) 5563 11263 0.5282 
8 𝜂𝐿,𝜂𝐺  (VAR) 5262 10799 0.5468 
9 𝜂𝐿,𝜂𝐺 , 𝜔 (VAR) 4807 10024 0.5761 
10 𝜂𝐿,𝜂𝐺 , 𝜔, 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  (VAR) 4689 9924 0.5839 
11 𝜂  (CVAR) 5773 11683 0.5156 
12 𝜂𝐿,𝜂𝐺  (CVAR) 5273 10819 0.5461 
13 𝜂𝐿,𝜂𝐺 , 𝜔 (CVAR) 4988 10385 0.5642 
14 𝜂𝐿,𝜂𝐺 , 𝜔, 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  (CVAR) 4871 10288 0.5719 
15 𝜂  (GR) 5517 11171 0.5310 
16 𝜂𝐿,𝜂𝐺  (GR) 5165 10603 0.5529 
17 𝜂𝐿,𝜂𝐺 , 𝜔 (GR) 4770 9950 0.5785 
18 𝜂𝐿,𝜂𝐺 , 𝜔, 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  (GR) 4648 9841 0.5867 
 
Tab. 2. Model comparison analysis of models based on a non-linear value function or on risk-return accounts. 
These models are compared to Model one, which is based on logistic regression. Free parameters are reported 
in column two and can include a value function parameter 𝛼 (that can be estimated separately for losses and 
gains, resulting in 𝛼𝐿  and 𝛼𝐺 , respectively), a loss weight parameter λ, a risk weight parameter 𝜂 (that can be 
estimated separately for losses and gains, resulting in 𝜂𝐿 and 𝜂𝐺, respectively), a gambling bias parameter 𝜔, 
and a coefficient associated with the feedback/no-feedback condition ( 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑). For risk-return models, column 
two reports whether variance (VAR), coefficient of variation (CVAR) or gambling range (GR) is considered. The 
third and fourth columns report the negative log-likelihood and BIC score summed across participants, 
respectively. The fifth column reports the exponential of the log-likelihood divided by the total number of trials 
across participants. This quantity can be interpreted as the proportion of trials correctly predicted by the 
model. The model with lowest BIC score (Model one) is marked with asterisks. 
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Fig 1. Task paradigm and behavioural results. A: Description of the task, illustrating an example of two 
consecutive trials. After an intertrial interval (ITI) of one second, a sure option (e.g., £6) and a 50-50 gamble 
(e.g., having either £10 or £2 as possible outcomes) are presented. In some blocks (as in the example 
illustrated here), outcome feedback is provided (e.g., £6) for one second after choice, while in other blocks 
outcome feedback is not provided and a new trial starts immediately after choice. The figure illustrates also 
the following trial, in this instance offering a choice between a sure £7 loss and a gamble associated with 
either a £9 or £5 loss. Note the text is coloured green and red for trials involving gains and losses, respectively. 
Across trials, we manipulated the expected value (EV; note the two options always had equivalent EV), 
corresponding to £6 and -£7, respectively, for the two trials in the example. We also manipulated orthogonally 
the gambling range (GR), corresponding to £8 and £4, respectively, for the two trials in the example. B: 
Gambling proportion for the different experimental conditions. Statistical tests indicate a higher gambling for 
feedback versus no-feedback (F(1,22) = 17.61, p < 0.001) and for gain versus loss (F(1,22) = 5.54, p = 0.028), 
with no interaction (F(1,22) = 0.21, p = 0.653). C: Relationship between the EV-related gambling parameter 𝛽𝐸𝑉  
and the GR-related gambling parameter 𝛽𝐺𝑅  across participants, which is not statistically significant (r(21) = -
0.058, p = 793). D: Gambling proportion for trials characterized by small GR (in which GR = 2), medium GR (in 
which GR = 4 or GR = 6), and large GR (in which GR = 8), plotted separately for participants having a positive 
GR-related gambling parameter 𝛽𝐺𝑅  (n = 13; in yellow) and participants having a negative GR-related gambling 
parameter 𝛽𝐺𝑅  (n = 10; in cyan). E: Gambling proportion for trials characterized by large losses (in which EV = -
10, EV = -9, or EV = -8), small losses (in which EV = -7, EV = -6, or EV = -5), small gains (in which EV = 5, EV = 6, 
or EV = 7), and large gains (in which EV = 8, EV = 9, or EV = 10), plotted separately for participants having a 
positive EV-related gambling parameter 𝛽𝐸𝑉  (n = 18; in blue) and participants having a negative EV-related 
gambling parameter 𝛽𝐸𝑉  (n = 5; in red). 
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Fig 2. Relationship between response in ventral striatum at option presentation and the effect of feedback on 
choice. A: In red, voxels within ventral striatum in which activity for gambling versus sure choices was larger 
during feedback compared to no-feedback trials. (left: -12, 8, -2; Z = 4.71; p < 0.001 SVC; right: 9, 8, 1; Z = 4.21; 
p = 0.001 SVC). For display purposes, voxels characterized by a statistic associated with p < 0.001 uncorrected 
are highlighted. B: The relationship between the effect of gambling versus sure choices during feedback 
compared to no-feedback (a feedback-choice interaction) in BOLD activity and the individual effect of feedback 
on choice (𝛽𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑) is plotted for the peak activation voxel within striatum, ,where a trend towards a positive 
correlation emerges (15, 17, -2; Z = 3.04; r(21) = 0.614; p = 0.039 SVC). 
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Fig 3. Relationship between vmPFC activity at option presentation and EV-related preference. A: Voxels within 
vmPFC in which, across participants, the effect of EV on BOLD response correlated negatively with the EV-
related gambling parameter 𝛽𝐸𝑉. For display purposes, voxels characterized by a statistic associated with p < 
0.001 uncorrected are highlighted in red. B: The relationship between the effect of EV on BOLD response and 
the EV-related gambling parameter 𝛽𝐸𝑉  is plotted for the peak activation voxel within vmPFC, where a trend 
towards a negative correlation emerges (12, 41, -11; Z = 3.13; r(21) = -0.616; p = 0.033 SVC). C: BOLD response 
in vmPFC (12, 41, -11) for trials characterized by large losses (in which EV = -10, EV = -9, or EV = -8), small losses 
(in which EV = -7, EV = -6, or EV = -5), small gains (in which EV = 5, EV = 6, or EV = 7), and large gains (in which 
EV = 8, EV = 9, or EV = 10), plotted separately for participants having an EV-related gambling parameter 𝛽𝐸𝑉  
larger than 0.1, (n = 7; in blue), participants having a EV-related gambling parameter 𝛽𝐸𝑉  larger than zero and 
smaller than 0.1 (n = 9; in cyan), and participants having a EV-related gambling parameter 𝛽𝐸𝑉  smaller than 
zero (n = 5; in red). The BOLD response corresponds to the beta weight of a GLM including specific regressors 
for each EV bin. This GLM was estimated for display purposes. 
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Fig 4. Relationship between anterior insula response at option presentation and risk. A: In red, voxels within 
insula in which activity increased for gambling compared to sure choices (left: -33, 17, -8; Z = 3.59; p = 0.010 
SVC; right: 33, 20, -5; Z = 4.71; p < 0.001). In yellow, voxels within insula in which activity correlated with GR 
(left: -33, 23, -5; Z = 3.66; p = 0.008 SVC; right: 42, 20, -5; Z = 3.68; p = 0.008 SVC). In green, voxels within insula 
in which the effect of GR on BOLD activity was stronger during gambling compared to sure choices (left: -30, 
26, -8; Z = 3.64; p = 0.008 SVC; a trend emerged on the right hemisphere: 45, 32, -2; Z = 3.03; p = 0.042 SVC). In 
orange, voxels in which these effects overlap. For display purposes, voxels characterized by a statistic 
associated with p < 0.001 uncorrected are highlighted. B: BOLD response in anterior insula (-30, 26, -8) for 
trials characterized by small GR (in which GR = 2), medium GR (in which GR = 4 or GR = 6), and large GR (in 
which GR = 8), plotted separately for gambling (in green) and sure choices (in orange). The BOLD response 
corresponds to the beta weight of a GLM including specific regressors for each GR bin. This GLM was estimated 
for display purposes. 
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Fig 5. Relationship between anterior insula response at option presentation and individual risk preferences. A: 
In red, voxels within insula in which activity for gambling versus sure choices correlated negatively with a 
baseline gambling bias µ across participants. In green, voxels within insula in which, when comparing gambling 
and sure choices, the association between GR and insula response correlated inversely with the GR-related 
gambling propensity 𝛽𝐺𝑅. In dark green, voxels in which these effects overlap. For display purposes, voxels 
characterized by a statistic associated with p < 0.001 uncorrected are highlighted. B: The relationship between 
the effect of gambling versus sure choices on BOLD response and a baseline gambling bias µ is plotted for the 
peak activation voxel within insula (39, 17, -8; Z = 3.94; r(21) = -0.728; p = 0.003 SVC). C: The relationship 
between the effect of GR during gambling versus sure choices (GR-choice interaction) on BOLD response and a 
GR-related gambling propensity 𝛽𝐺𝑅  is plotted for the peak activation voxel within insula, where a trend 
towards significance emerges (-33, 29, -5; Z = 3.39; r(21) = -0.655; p = 0.016 SVC). 
 
 
 
